Iterated regret minimization has been introduced recently by J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass in classical strategic games. For many games of interest, this new solution concept provides solutions that are judged more reasonable than solutions offered by traditional game concepts -such as Nash equilibrium -. Although computing iterated regret on explicit matrix game is conceptually and computationally easy, nothing is known about computing the iterated regret on games whose matrices are defined implicitly using game tree, game DAG or, more generally game graphs. In this paper, we investigate iterated regret minimization for infinite duration two-player quantitative non-zero sum games played on graphs.
Introduction
The analysis of complex interactive systems like embedded systems or distributed systems is a major challenge of computer aided verification. Zero-sum games on graphs provide a good framework to model interactions between a component and an environment as they are strictly competitive. However in the context of modern interactive systems, several components may interact and be controlled independently. Non-zero sum games on graphs are more accurate to model such systems, as the objectives are not necessarily antagonist. There are initial results in this area but a large number of questions are open. In this paper, we adapt to game graphs a new solution concept of non-zero sum games initially defined for strategic games.
In [7] , J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass defined the notion of iterated regret minimization. This solution concept assumes that instead of trying to minimize what she has to pay, each player tries to minimize her regret. The regret is informally defined as the difference between what a player actually pays and what she could have payed if she knew the strategy chosen by the other player. More formally, if u 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ) represents what Player 1 pays when the pair of strategies (λ 1 , λ 2 ) is played, reg 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ) = u 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ) − min λ ′ 1 u 1 (λ ′ 1 , λ 2 ). Let us illustrate this on an example. Consider the strategic game defined by the matrix of figure 1. In the game underlying this matrix, Player 1 has two strategies A 1 and B 1 and Player 2 has two strategies A 2 and B 2 . The two players choose a strategy at the same time and the pairs of strategies define what the two players have to pay 1 . The regret of playing A 1 for Player 1 if Player 2 plays A 2 is equal to 1 because u 1 (A 1 , A 2 ) is 2 when u 1 (B 1 , A 2 ) is 1. Knowing that Player 2 plays A 2 , Player 1 should have played B 1 .
As Players have to choose strategies before knowing how the adversary will play, we associate a regret with each strategy as follows. The regret of a strategy λ 1 of Player 1 is : reg 1 (λ 1 ) = max λ2 reg 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ). In the example, the regret attached to strategy A 1 is equal to ′ 1 and Λ ′ 2 respectively. In the case of finite matrix games, this operator is monotone and converges on the strategies that minimize regrets for the two players making the assumption of rationality of the other player.
In this paper, we consider games where the matrix is not given explicitly but defined implicitly by a game graph. More precisely, we consider graphs where vertices are partitioned into vertices that belong to Player 1 and vertices that belong to Player 2. Each edge is annotated by a penalty for Player 1 and one for Player 2. Additionally, there are two designated sets of vertices, one that Player 1 tries to reach and the other one that Player 2 tries to reach. The game starts in the initial vertex of the graph and is played for an infinite number of rounds as follows.
In each round, the Player who owns the vertex on which the pebble is placed moves the the pebble to an adjacent vertex using an edge of the graph, and a new round starts. The infinite plays generate an infinite sequence of vertices and the amount that the players have to pay are computed as follows. Player 1 pays +∞ if the sequence does not reach the target set assigned to Player 1, otherwise she pays the sum of edge costs assigned to her on the prefix up to the first visit to her target set. The amount to pay for Player 2 is defined symmetrically. Strategies in such games are functions from the set of histories of plays (sequences of visited vertices) to edges (choice of moves for the pebble).
Let us consider the game graph of Fig. 1 . This is a formalization of the so-called Centipede game [9] in our game graphs. We have considered a 5-round variant here, this game can be generalized to any number of rounds. Initially, the pebble is on vertex A. Player 1 owns the circle vertices and Player 2 owns the square vertices. The target objective for the two players is the same: they both want to reach vertex S. At each round, one of the players has to choose either to stop the game and reach the target, or to let the game continue for at least an additional round. The penalties attached to edges are given as pairs of integers (the first for Player 1 and the second for Player 2). Strategies here are as follows. For each circle vertex, Player 1 must decide either to continue or to go to the target S, and symmetrically for Player 2. It can be shown (and computed by our algorithms) that the strategy of Player 1 that survives iterated regret minimization is the strategy that stops the game only in position E and the strategy for Player 2 is the strategy that continue the game to vertex D. This pair of strategy has a penalty of (1, 3) . This is an interesting and rather nice joint behavior of the two players in comparison of what Nash equilibrium is predicting for this example. Indeed, the only Nash equilibrium 2 in that game is the pair of strategies where the two players decide to stop directly the game and so they have to pay (5, 7). This is a 5-round example but the difference between the penalty of the Nash equilibrium and the iterated regret grows as the number of rounds increases. Contributions We investigate iterated regret minimization for infinite duration two-player quantitative non-zero sum games played on graphs. We focus on reachability objectives that are not necessarily antagonist.
We first consider target-weighted arenas, where the payoff function is defined for each state of the objectives. We give a PTIME algorithm to compute the regret by reduction to a min-max game.
We then consider edge-weighted arenas. Each edge is labeled by a pair of integers -one for each player -, and the payoffs are defined by the sum of the weights along the path until the first visit to an objective. We give a pseudo-PTIME algorithm to compute the regret in an edge-weighted arena, by reduction to a target-weighted arena.
We also study the problem of iterated regret minimization. We provide a delete operator that removes strictly dominated strategies. We show how to compute the effect of iterating this operator on tree arenas and strictly positive edge-weighted arenas. In the first case, we provide a quadratic time algorithm and in the second case, a pseudo-exponential time algorithm.
Related works Several notions of equilibria have been proposed in the literature for reasoning on 2-players nonzero-sum games, for instance Nash equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium -see [8] for an overview. Those equilibria formalize notions of rational behavior by defining optimality criteria for pairs of strategies. As we have seen in the Centipede game example [9], or as it can be shown for other examples like the Traveller's dilemma [1] , Nash equilibria sometimes suggest pairs of strategies that are rejected by common sense. Regret minimization is an alternative solution concept that sometimes proposes more intuitive solutions and requires more cooperation between players. Recently, non-zero sum games played on graphs have attracted a lot of attention. There have been several papers that study Nash equilibria or particular classes of Nash equilibria [6, 3, 2, 4] .
Proofs that are sketched or omitted in the paper are given in Appendix.
Weighted Games and Regret
Given a cartesian product A × B of two sets, we denote by proj i the i-th projection, i = 1, 2. It is naturally extended to sequence of elements of A × B by
Reachability Games Turn-based two-player games are played on game arenas by two players. A (finite) game arena is a tuple G = (S = S 1 ⊎ S 2 , s 0 , T ) where S 1 , S 2 are finite disjoint sets of player positions (S 1 for Player 1 and S 2 for Player 2), s 0 ∈ S 1 is the initial position, and T ⊆ S × S is the transition relation. A finite play on G of length n is a finite word π = π 0 π 1 . . . π n ∈ S * such that π 0 = s 0 and for all i = 0, . . . , n − 1, (π i , π i+1 ) ∈ T . Infinite plays are defined similarly. We denote by P f (G) (resp. P ∞ (G)) the set of finite (resp. infinite) plays on G, and we let P(G) = P f (G) ∪ P ∞ (G). For any node s ∈ S, we denote by (G, s) the arena G where the initial position is s.
Let i ∈ {1, 2}. We let −i = 1 if i = 2 and −i = 2 if i = 1. A strategy λ i : P f (G) → S ∪ {⊥} for Player i is a mapping that maps any finite play π whose last positiondenoted last(π) -is in S i to ⊥ if there is no outgoing edge from last(π), and to a position s such that (last(π), s) ∈ T otherwise. The set of strategies of Player i in G is denoted by
is finite, then there is not outgoing edge from last(π), and (iii) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ |π| and all
A strategy λ i is memoryless if for all play π ∈ P f (G), λ i (π) only depends on last(π). Thus λ i can be seen as a function S i → S ∪ {⊥}. It is finite-memory if λ i (π) only depends on last(π) and on some state of a finite state set. We refer the reader to [5] for formal definitions.
A reachability winning condition (rwc for short) for Player i is given by a subset of positions C i ⊆ S -called the target set -. A play π ∈ P(G) is winning for Player i if some position of π is in C i . A strategy λ i for Player i is winning if all the plays of Out G (λ i ) are winning. In this paper, we often consider two target sets C 1 , C 2 for Player 1 and 2 respectively. We write (S 1 , S 2 , s 0 , T, C 1 , C 2 ) to denote the game arena G extended with those target sets. Finally, let λ i ∈ Λ i (G) be a winning strategy for Player i and
We also extend this notation to sets of plays Out G,Ci (λ i ) naturally.
Weighted Games
We add weights on edges of arenas and include the target sets. A (finite) weighted game arena is a tuple
where (S, s 0 , T ) is a game arena, for all i = 1, 2, µ i : T → N is a weigth function for Player i and C i its target set. We let M G i be the maximal weight of Player i, i.e.
. G is a target-weighted arena (TWA for short) if only the edges leading to a target node are weighted by strictly positive integers, and any two edges leading to the same node carry the same weight. Formally, for all (s, s
Thus for target-weighted arenas, we assume in the sequel that the weight functions map C i to N.
Let π = π 0 π 1 . . . π n be a finite play in G. We extend the weight functions to finite plays, so that for all i = 1, 2,
is +∞ if π is not winning for Player i, and the sum of the weights occuring along the edges defined by π until the first visit to a target position otherwise. Formally:
We extend this notion to the utility of two strategies λ 1 , λ 2 of Player 1 and 2 respectively:
Let i ∈ {1, 2}. Given a strategy λ i ∈ Λ i (G), the best response of Player −i to λ i , denoted by br
, is the least utility Player −i can achieve against λ i . Formally:
Regret Let i ∈ {1, 2} and let λ 1 , λ 2 be two strategies of Player 1 and 2 respectively. The regret of Player i is the difference between the utility Player i achieves and the best response to the strategy of Player −i. for Player 1, i.e. br 
Regret Minimization on TargetWeighted Graphs
In this section, our aim is to give an algorithm to compute the regret for Player i. This is done by reduction to a minmax game, defined in the sequel. We say that we solve the regret minimization problem (RMP for short) if we can compute the minimal regret and a (finite representation of a) strategy that achieves this value.
Minmax games Let
be a TWA and i = 1, 2. We define the value minmax G i as follows:
and a memoryless strategy that achieves this value can be computed in time
Proof. For all j ≥ 0, we let W j ⊆ S be the set of positions from which Player i has a strategy to reach a position s ∈ C i in at most j steps, such that µ i (s) ≤ K and such that she does not pass by a position s ′ ∈ C i such that
The sequence W 0 , W 1 , . . . converges in at most |S| steps to a set W * , and minmax
we add counters to positions that counts the number of their successors that are not already in the current set W j . When adding a new node to W j , we decrement the counter of its predecessor by one (if it was not already 0). Let s be one of its predecessors and c its counter value. If s ∈ S i and c is strictly lesser than the number of its successors, s will be added to W j+1 . If s ∈ S −i and c = 0, then all the successors of s are in W j , therefore s will be added to W j+1 . Now, in order to compute the value minmax G i , we use the previous algorithm as the building block of a dichotomy algorithm that starts with the maximal finite value which can be achieve by Player i if she has a winning strategy to its target, i.e. M = +∞, then any strategy achieves this value. Otherwise in order to extract a strategy, it suffices to keep for each position s ∈ W j ∩ S i , a pointer to a position s ′ ∈ W j−1 such that (s, s ′ ) ∈ T when computing the sequence of W j 's. Note that this strategy is memoryless.
Since roles of the players are symmetric, without loss of generality we can focus on computing the regret of Player 1 only. Therefore we do not consider Player 2's targets and weights. Let G = (S = S 1 ⊎ S 2 , s 0 , T, µ 1 , C 1 ) be a TWA (assumed to be fixed from now on). Let λ 1 ∈ Λ 1 (G) be a winning strategy of Player 1 (if it exists). Player 2 can enforce Player 1 to follow one of the paths of Out G,C1 (λ 1 ) by choosing a suitable strategy. When choosing a path π ∈ Out G,Ci (λ 1 ), in order to maximize the regret of Player 1, Player 2 cooperates (i.e. she minimizes the utility) if Player 1 would have deviated from π. This leads to the notion of best alternative along a path. Informally, the best alternative along π is the minimal value Player 1 could have achieved if she deviated from π, assuming Player 2 cooperates. Since Player 2 can enforce one of the paths of Out G,C1 (λ 1 ), to maximize the regret of Player 1, she will choose the path π with the highest difference between u G 1 (π) and the minimal best alternative along π. As an example consider the TWA arena of Fig. 3 . In this example, if Player 1 moves from C to E, then along the path ACE, the best alternative is 0. Indeed, the other alternative was to go from C to F and in this case, Player 2 would have cooperated.
We now formally define the notion of best alternative. Let s ∈ S 1 . The best value that can be achieved from s by Player 1 when Player 2 cooperates is defined by:
, is defined as the minimal value she could have achieved by choosing another successor of s (assuming Player 2 cooperates). Formally:
with min ∅ = +∞. Finally, the best alternative of a path π = s 0 s 1 . . . s n is defined as +∞ if n = 0 and as the minimal best alternative of the edges of π otherwise:
We first transform the graph G into a graph G ′ such that all the paths that lead to a node s have the same best alternative. This can be done since the number of best alternatives is bounded by |C 1 |. The construction of G ′ is done inductively by storing the best alternatives in the positions.
Definition 1. The graph of best alternatives of G is the
TWA G ′ = (S ′ = S ′ 1 ⊎ S ′ 2 , s ′ 0 , T ′ , µ ′ 1 , C ′ 1 ) defined by: • S ′ i = S i × ([M G 1 ] ∪ {+∞}), i = 1, 2 and s ′ 0 = (s 0 , +∞); • for all (s, b 1 ), (s ′ , b ′ 1 ) ∈ S ′ , ((s, b 1 ), (s ′ , b ′ 1 )) ∈ T ′ iff (s, s ′ ) ∈ T and b ′ 1 = min(b 1 , ba G 1 (s, s ′ )) if s ∈ S 1 b 1 if s ∈ S 2 • C ′ 1 = S ′ 1 ∩ (C 1 × [M G 1 ]) and ∀(s, b) ∈ C ′ 1 , µ ′ 1 (s, b) = µ 1 (s).
Proposition 3. For all (s, b) ∈ S
′ and all finite path π in
Because the number of best alternatives is bounded by |C 1 |, the game G ′ can be constructed in polynomial time:
Since the best alternative information depends only on the paths, the paths of G and those of G ′ are in bijection. This bijection can be extended to strategies. In particular, we define two mappings b 1 ) . . . where b 0 = +∞ and for all j > 0,
. The mapping B is bijective, and its inverse corresponds to proj 1 .
The mapping Φ i maps any strategy
behaves as λ i on the first projection of the play and adds the best alternative information to the position.
just projects the best alternative information away. In particular, for all λ
Then, Φ i 's are bijective and Φ 1 preserves the regret values:
The best alternative information is crucial to compute the regret. This is a global information that allows us to compute the regret locally, as stated by the next lemma. For all (s, b) ∈ C ′ 1 , we let ν 1 (s, b) = µ 1 (s) − min(µ 1 (s), b). We extend ν 1 to pairs of strategies as usual -ν 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ) being infinite if λ 1 is losing -.
Proof. (Sketch) It is clear if λ 1 is losing. If it is winning, then let λ 2 which maximizes reg
we can assume that λ 2 cooperates if Player 1 would have deviated from π, i.e. λ 2 minimizes the utility in the subgames (G, s) where s is not the successor of some element of π. The best response to λ 2 is either the value u G ′ 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ), i.e. µ 1 (last(π)), or the minimal best alternative along π. By Proposition 3, this minimal best alternative along π is exactly proj 2 (last(π)).
Conversely, for any strategy λ 2 which maximizes ν 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ), we can also assume without changing the value ν 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ) that λ 2 cooperates if Player 1 would have deviated from Out G ′ (λ 1 , λ 2 ), and we therefore have reg
We can now reduce the RMP to a min-max problem :
Proof It is a consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2:
As a consequence of Propositions 2, 4 and Lemma 3, we can solve the RMP on TWA's. We first compute the graph of best alternatives and solve a minmax game. This gives us a memoryless strategy that achieves the minimal regret in the graph of best alternatives. To compute a strategy in the original graph, we apply the inverse mapping Φ −1 1 : this gives a finite-memory strategy whose memory is exactly the best alternative seen along the current finite play. Therefore the needed memory is bounded by the number of best alternatives, which is bounded by |C 1 |.
Regret Minimization in EdgeWeighted Graphs
In this section, we give a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to solve the RMP in weighted arenas (with weights on edges). In a first step, we prove that if the regret is finite, the strategies minimizing the regret generates outcomes whose utility is bounded by some value which depends on the graph. This allows us to reduce the problem to the RMP in a TWA, which can then be solved by the algorithm of the previous section. Let G = (S = S 1 ⊎ S 2 , s 0 , T, µ 1 , C 1 ) be a weigthed game arena with objective C 1 . As in the previous section, we assume that we want to minimize the regret of Player 1, so we omit the weight function and the target of Player 2.
Definition 2 (Bounded strategies). Let
Note that a bounded strategy is necessarily winning, since by definition, the utility of some outcome is infinite iff it is loosing. The following lemma states that the winning strategies that minimize the regret of Player 1 are bounded.
Lemma 4. For all weighted arena
and for any strategy
Proof. Since we consider reachability games, it is wellknown that if there is a winning strategy for Player 1, there is a memoryless strategy γ 1 winning for Player 1 (see for instance [5] ). In particular, for all λ 2 ∈ Λ 2 (G), Out G,C1 (γ 1 , λ 2 ) does not contain twice the same position. Indeed, if there is a loop, since the strategy is memoryless, Player 2 can enforce Player 1 to take this loop infinitely many times. Therefore for all λ 2 ∈ Λ 2 (G), u
Therefore the following holds:
Finally let λ 1 be a winning strategy which minimizes the regret of Player 1, and λ 2 ∈ Λ 2 (G). We have reg
Let B = 2M G |S|. Thanks to Lemma 4 we can reduce the RMP in a weighted arena into the RMP in a TWA. Indeed, it suffices to enrich every position of the arena with the sum of the weights occuring along the path used to reach this position. A position may be reachable by several paths, therefore it will be duplicated as many times as they are different path utilities. This may be unbounded, but Lemma 4 ensures that it is sufficient to sum the weights up to B only. This may results in a larger graph, but its size is still pseudo-polynomial (polynomial in the maximal weight and the size of the graph).
We now prove that reg
The utility information added to the nodes of G is uniquely determined by the path used to reach the current position. Therefore the strategies of both players in G can naturally be mapped to strategies in G ′ . More formally, we define a mapping
The mapping Φ is surjective, but not necessarily injective. Indeed, two strategies that behave similarly up to an utility B are mapped to the same strategy in
(on the first projections of plays) while the utility of the play is bounded by B is a preimage of λ ′ i . Formally, for all h = s 0 s 1 . . . s n ∈ P(G), we leth = (s 0 , u 0 )(s 1 , u 1 ) . . . (s n , u n ) where for all j, u i = µ 1 (s 0 . . . s j ). Then, any strategy λ i ∈ Λ i (G) is a preimage of λ ′ i iff for all finite play h ∈ P(G) such that last(h) ∈ S i , all s ∈ S, all u ∈ N, if λ ′ i (h) is defined and equal to (s, u), then λ i (h) = s.
Lemma 5. For all
We denote by Λ ≤B 1 (G) the set of strategies bounded by B. The mapping Φ preserves the regret values for bounded strategies:
Note that any strategy λ 1 ∈ Λ 1 (G) is bounded by B iff Φ(λ 1 ) is winning in G ′ for Player 1. We can now prove the correctness of the reduction:
Since Φ(λ 1 ) is winning, λ 1 is bounded by B, and a fortiori winning. Thus reg G 1 < +∞, which is a contradiction. Therefore reg
Thus there is a winning strategy λ 1 which minimizes the regret. By Lemma 4, λ 1 is bounded B. By Lemma 6, reg
is winning, γ 1 is bounded by B, and by Lemma 6, reg
To solve the RMP for a weighted arena G, we first construct the graph of utility G ′ , and then apply Theorem 1, since G ′ is a TWA. Correctness is ensured by Lemma 7. This returns a finite-memory strategy of G ′ that minimizes the regret, whose memory is the best alternative seen so far. To obtain a strategy of G minimizing the regret, one applies the inverse mapping Φ −1 defined previously. This gives us a finite-memory strategy whose memory is the utility of the current play up to M G and the best alternative seen so far.
Theorem 2. The RMP on a weighted arena
G = (S = S 1 ⊎ S 2 , s 0 , T, µ 1 , C 1 ) can be solved in time O (M G ) 2 · log 2 (|S| · M G ) · |S| · C 1 · (|S| + |T |) .
Iterated Regret Minimization (IRM)
In this section, we show how to compute the iterated regret for tree arenas and for weighted arenas where weights are strictly positive (by reduction to a tree arena). Let G = (S = S 1 ⊎ S 2 , s 0 , T, µ 1 , µ 2 , C 1 , C 2 ) be a weighted arena. Let i ∈ {1, 2}, P i ⊆ Λ i (G) and P −i ⊆ Λ −i (G). The regret of Player i when she plays strategies of P i and when Player −i plays strategies of P −i is defined by:
For all λ i ∈ P i and λ −i ∈ P −i , we define reg G,Pi,P−i i (λ i ) and reg G,Pi,P−i i (λ i , λ −i ) accordingly. We now define the strategies of rank j, which are the one that survived j times the deletion of strictly dominated strategies. The strategies of rank 0 for Player i is Λ i (G). The strategies of rank 1 for both players are those which minimize their regret against strategy of rank 0. More generally, the strategies of rank j for Player i are the strategies of rank j − 1 which minimize her regret against Player −i's strategies of rank j − 1. Formally, strategies of rank j are obtained via a delete operator D : 2
We denote by D j the composition of D j times.
Definition 4 (j-th regret). Let j ≥ 0. The set of strategies of rank j for Player i is P
The j + 1-th regret for Player i is defined by reg 
i (λ i ) (because we maximize over less strategies). Therefore reg
Clearly, the sequence of regrets converges: Proposition 6. There is an integer ⋆ ≥ 1 such that for all j ≥ ⋆, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, reg
Definition 5 (iterated regret). For all i = 1, 2, the iterated regret of Player i is reg
G,⋆ i .
Example 2. As we already saw in the Centipede Game depicted on Fig. 2, the Player 1's strategy minimizing her regret is to stop at the last step (move from A to B, from C to D and from E to S). Its regret value is 1. The Player 2's strategy minimizing her regret is also to stop at the last step, i.e. to move from B to C and from D to E,
her regret being 1. Therefore reg 
IRM in Tree Arenas
In this section, we let i ∈ {1, 2} and G = (S = S 1 ⊎ S 2 , s 0 , T, µ 1 , µ 2 , C 1 , C 2 ) be a finite edge-weighted tree arena. We can transform G into a target-weighted tree arena such that C 1 = C 2 (denoted by C in the sequel) is the set of leaves of the tree, if we allow the functions µ i to take the value +∞. This transformation results in a new target-weighted tree arena
with the same set of states and transitions as G and for all leaf s ∈ C, µ
where π is the root-to-leave path leading to s. The time complexity of this transformation is O(|S|).
We now assume that G = (S = S 1 ⊎ S 2 , s 0 , T, µ 1 , µ 2 , C) is a target-weighted tree arena where C is the set of leaves. Our goal is to define a delete operator D such that D(G) is a subtree of G such that for all i = 1, 2, Λ i (D(G)) are the strategies of Λ i (G) that minimize reg G i . In other words, any pairs of subsets of strategies for both players in G can be represented by a subtree of G. This is possible since all the strategies in a tree arena are memoryless. A set of strategies P i ⊆ Λ i (G) is therefore represented by removing from G all the edges (s, s ′ ) such that there is no strategy λ i ∈ P i such that λ i (s) = s ′ . In our case, one first compute the sets of strategies that minimize regret. This is done as in Section 3 by constructing the tree of best alternatives H (but in this case with the best alternative of both players) and by solving a min-max game. From H we delete all edges that are not compatible with a strategy that minimize the minmax value of some player. We obtain therefore a subtree D(H) of H such that any strategy of H is a strategy of D(H) for Player i iff it minimizes the minmax value in H for Player i. By projecting away the best alternative information in D(H), we obtain a subtree D(G) of G such that any Player i's strategy of G is a strategy of D(G) iff it minimizes Player i's regret in G. We can iterate this process to compute the iterated regret, and we finally obtain a subtree D * (G) such that any strategy of G minimizes the iterated regret for Player i iff it is a Player i's strategy in D * (G).
Definition 6. The tree of best alternatives of G is the tree
, where π s is the path from the root s 0 to s;
Note that H is isomorphic to G. There is indeed a oneto-one mapping Φ between the states of G and the states of H: for all s ∈ S, Φ(s) is the only state s ′ ∈ S ′ of the form s ′ = (s, b 1 , b 2 ). Moreover, this mapping is naturally extended to strategies. Since all strategies are memoryless, any strategy
. Without loss of generality and for a technical reason, we assume that any strategy λ i is only defined for states s ∈ S i that are compatible with this strategy, i.e. if s is not reachable under λ i then the value of λ i does not need to be defined. The lemmas of Section 3 still hold for the tree H:
As in Section 3, the RMP on a tree arena can be solved by min-max game. For all s ∈ S ′ , we de-
and compute this value by a backward induction algorithm. In particular, minmax
The backward algorithm not only allows us to compute minmax H i for all i ∈ {1, 2}, but also to compute a subtree D(H) that represents all the Player i's strategies that achieve this value. We actually define the operator D in two steps. First, we remove the edges (s,
i for all i = 1, 2. We obtain a new graph H ′ consisting of several disconnected tree components. In particular, there are some states no longer reachable from the root s (D(H) ) is defined on its outcomes in H, but when opposed to any strategy λ −i ∈ Λ −i (D(H)), its outcomes are in D(H). Thus, when we iterate this operator, we do not need to remember H ′ and we can consider only the tree D(H). The tree D(H) represents the strategy of H that minimize the regret in the following sense:
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the strategies minimizing the regret in G and the strategies minimizing the minmax value in H, we can define D(G) by applying to D(H) the isomorphism Φ −1 , in other words by projecting the best alternatives away, and by restoring the functions µ i . The set of strategies
) (in other words, these are the strategies of D(H) where we project the best alternatives away). Let λ i ∈ Λ i (G), by Lemma 8, it minimizes reg 
We obtain a new tree D(G) whose Player i's strategies minimize the regret of Player i, for all i = 1, 2. We can iterate the regret computation on D(G) and get the Player i's strategies that minimize the regret of rank 2 of Player i, for all i = 1, 2. We continue iteration we get a tree
are Player i's strategies of G that minimize the j-th regret. Proposition 7. Let i ∈ {1, 2} and j > 0. We have reg
Proof. (sketch) By induction on j. It is clear for j = 1 and Lemma 10 ensures the correctness of the induction.
Proof. By Propositions 6 and 7, there is an integer j such that reg
. According to the definition of D(G), j ≤ |S| because we remove at least one edge of the tree at each step. Since |D(G)| can be constructed in O(|S|), the whole time complexity is O(|S| 2 ).
IRM in Positive Weighted Arenas
A weighted arena G is said to be positive if all edges are weighted by strictly positive weights only. In this section, we let G = (S = S 1 ⊎ S 2 , s 0 , T, µ 1 , µ 2 , C 1 , C 2 ) be a positive weighted arena. Remind that P j i (G) is the set of strategies that minimize reg G,j i , for all j ≥ 0 and i = 1, 2. Definition 7 (j-winning and j-bounded strategies).
winning. It is j-bounded by some B ≥ 0 if it is jwinning, and for all
Note that j-boundedness differs from boundedness as we require that the utilities of both players are bounded.
We get a similar result than the boundedness of strategies that miminize the regret of rank 1, but for any rank: Proof. (Sketch) First, if the regrets of first rank are infinite for both players, then by definition of the iterated regret, P 1 1 = Λ 1 (G) and P 1 2 = Λ 2 (G) and thus their regrets are infinite at any rank. Therefore there is no winning strategy at any rank (otherwise one of the regrets would be finite).
Suppose that the first regret of Player i is finite for some i = 1, 2. By Lemma 4, the winning strategies minimizing her first regret are bounded by 2M G |S|. Since the weights are strictly positive, the lengths of the outcomes until C i are bounded by 2M G |S|, which allows us to bound the utilities of Player −i until a first visit to
for all j ≥ 1, the strategies of Player i (which are necessarily winning as the regret is finite) at any rank are bounded by 2(M G ) 2 |S|. This bound is then used (non-trivially) to bound the winning strategies of Player −i by 6(M G ) 3 |S|. The full proof is in Appendix.
Lemma 11 allows us to reduce the problem to the iterated regret minimization in a weighted tree arena, by unfolding the graph arena G up to some maximal utility value. Lemma 11 suggests to take b G for this maximal value. However the best responses to a strategy jbounded by b G are not necessarily bounded by b G , but they are necessarily j-bounded by b G · M G , since the weights are strictly positive. Therefore we let B G = b G · M G and take B G as the maximal value. Since the j-winning strategies are j-bounded by b G and the best responses are j-bounded by B G , we do not los the set of finite plays π of G such that µ G (π) ≤ K, for all i = 1, 2. Note that P K (G) is finite since G has only strictly positive weights. The unfolding of G up to B G is naturally defined by a tree weighted arena whose set of positions is P B G (G).
, for all i = 1, 2. As for edge-weighted arenas, this is done by defining a surjective mapping Φ from
. For all i = 1, 2 and all λ i ∈ Λ i (G), and all π ∈ P f (G) such that last(π) ∈ S i , Φ(λ i )(π) =⊥ if there is κ ∈ {1, 2} such that µ κ (π.λ i (π)) > B G , and Φ(λ i )(π) = π.λ i (π) otherwise. This mapping is surjective, but not injective, since two strategies that behave similarly up to some utility B G are mapped to the same strategy.
This allows us to prove the correctness of the reduction:
Proof. We prove that for all j ≥ 1, reg
, from which we get reg
By applying the algorithm of Section 5.1 we get: For all i = 1, 2, the procedure of Section 5.1 returns a finite-memory strategy λ i minimizing the iterated regret in G ′ whose memory is the best alternatives seen so far by both players. From λ i we can compute a finite-memory strategy in G minimizing the iterated regret of Player i, the needed memory is the best alternatives seen by both players and the current finite play up to B G . When the utility is greater than B G , then any move is allowed. Therefore one needs to add one more bit of memory expressing whether the utility is greater than B G . Finally, the unfolding of the graph arena up to B G is used to finitely represent the (potentially infinite) sets of strategies of rank j in G. Finding such a representation is not obvious for the full class of weighted arenas, since before reaching its objective, a player can take a 0-cost loop finitely many times without affecting her minimal regret. This suggests to add fairness conditions on edges to compute the iterated regret. This is illustrated by the following example. 
Conclusion
The theory of infinite qualitive non-zero sum games over graphs is still in an initial development stage. We adapted a new solution concept from strategic games to game graphs, and gave algorithms to compute the regret and iterated regret. The strategies returned by those algorithms have a finite memory. One open question is to know whether this memory is necessary. In other words, are memoryless strategies sufficient to minimize the (iterated) regret in game graphs? Another question is to determine the lower bound on the complexity of (iterated) regret minimization. Iterated regret minimization over the full class of graphs is still open. Finally, we think that this work can easily be extended to an n-player setting.
[ Proof. Proof by induction on |π|.
We now assume that the property is true for any finite
) be a path of length k + 1. We have:
Proposition 4
Proof. Constructing G ′ is done in three steps:
1. compute all the values best G 1 (s), for all s ∈ S; this step is equivalent to looking for the shortest path to the objective and has a complexity of O(log 2 (M G 1 )(|S| + |T |)).
compute all the values ba
, for all (s, s ′ ) ∈ T such that s ∈ S 1 ; it can be computed with a time complexity O(|T |)
construct G
′ by a fixpoint algorithm; this graph has at most |C 1 | × |S| states and |C 1 | × |T | transitions.
Lemma 2
Proof. Let
Suppose that λ 1 is a winning strategy and let λ 2 ∈ Λ 2 (G ′ ) which maximizes reg
We define a strategy λ ′ 2 that plays as λ 2 on π and cooperates with Player 1 if she would have deviated from π. Formally, for all h ∈ P(
Since λ 2 maximizes the regret, we get reg
The best response to λ ′ 2 either deviates from π or not. If the best response deviates from π at a node s j , j < n, i.e. chooses a node s ′ such that s ′ = s j+1 , then the utility of the best response, according to the definition of λ
The best response to λ ′ 2 minimizes over all those possibilities, therefore br
Conversely, let λ 2 which maximizes ν 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ). Since λ 1 is winning, we can define π = Out
. Similarly as forth direction of the proof, one can construct a strategy λ ′ 2 that plays like λ 2 along π and cooperates with Player 1 when deviating from π. Clearly, this strategy has the same outcome as λ 2 and we get reg
Lemma 1
Proof. The mapping Φ has been defined in the paper. It remains to prove that reg
Finally:
Missing Proofs of Section 4
Lemma 6 The proof of this lemma is supported by the following lemma, which says that under certain conditions, the utility of the outcomes in G and G ′ are equal modulo Φ:
is winning, and we let π = Out G,C1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ). We enrich π with the utilities of Player 1 by defining a path π ′ = (s 0 , u 0 ) . . . (s n , u n ) where π = s 0 . . . s n and for all j ≤ n, u j = µ ) and π = proj 1 (π ′ ). Clearly, π ′ is a winning play for Player 1 in G and by definition of Φ, π ′ = Out G,C1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ), from which we get the equality of the utilities.
We can now prove Lemma 6:
We assume that reg . By Lemma 9, applied to the tree D j (G), we have reg
By definition, reg
, we have reg
Missing Proofs of Section 5.2
In this section, we prove several lemmas that do not appear in the paper, especially to prove Lemma 13.
Lemma 11
Proof. Suppose that there is no winning strategy for both players in G. Therefore reg It is easy to verify that there is no j-winning strategy for both players and all ranks j.
Suppose that Player i has a winning strategy, for some i = 1, 2. Therefore by Lemma 4, the strategies minimizing the regret are bounded by 2M G |S|. Since S = +∞, from which we get P j0 −i = Λ −i (G). In both cases, we have P j0 −i = Λ −i (G). Since after reaching her objective, Player i can play however she wants without affecting her regret, there is a strategy γ −i ∈ Λ −i (G) that wins against all strategies of P j0 i and which is memoryless once Player i has reached his objective. Formally, there is a memoryless strategy γ ′ −i : S −i → S such that for all π ∈ P f (G) such that last(π) ∈ S −i , if π contains a position of C −i , then γ −i (π) = γ ′ −i (last(π)). Let λ i ∈ P j0 i .
We now bound the size of Out G,C−i (γ −i , λ i ), which will provide a bound on the utility. Let π −i = Out G,C−i (γ −i , λ i ) and π i = Out G,Ci (λ i , γ −i ). We consider two cases:
• if π −i is a prefix of π i . We already know that λ i is j-bounded by 2(M G ) 2 |S|, therefore we also get µ κ (π 2 ) ≤ µ κ (π 1 ) ≤ 2(M G ) 2 |S|, for all κ = 1, 2;
• if π i is a prefix of π −i , then π −i = π i π 
In both cases, we get µ κ (γ −i , λ i ) ≤ 3(M G ) 2 |S|, for all κ = 1, 2 and all λ i ∈ P j i . Therefore 0 ≤ br
, which holds for all λ i ∈ P j0 i . We also get reg
Let now λ −i which minimizes reg G,j0+1 −i and λ i ∈ P 
